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What can be learned about the European migration crisis by studying it at its margins? 
Framed by this question and premised on evidence collected during four months of field 
research in a central Italian province, the paper investigates the governance transformations 
engendered by the migration crisis through a study of the Extraordinary Reception Centres 
(CAS) set up by the Italian government to host asylum seekers across its territory. The paper 
builds upon Dikeç’s (2009) conceptualisation of the “where” of asylum to map their legal and 
geographical location within the EU border regime, and engages with current debates on EU 
borders a) to highlight the centrality of marginal locations such as Macerata to the 
functioning of the EU border regime, arguing that CAS are central to such regime as they 
confirm its humanitarian pretences b) to intervene on debates concerned with the spatiality of 
EU borders, arguing that greater analytical attention should be given to their territorial 
configurations c) to evidence the neoliberal character of the governance transformations 
engendered by the crisis, beyond their migration management function. Border management 
is an engine of state transformation. The paper highlights the all-pervasiveness of 
neoliberalism in this process and the weakening of democratic accountability that 
accompanies it. It suggests, on these bases, that what can be learned about the European 
migration crisis by studying it at its margins, is that the governance transformations it has 




In many respects, the Macerata province of the Marche Region of Italy, the empirical setting 
of this article, could not be more peripheral to the ongoing migration crisis in Europe. The 
nearby port of Ancona has ceased to be one of the main entry points for Afghans, Pakistanis 
and Syrians arriving from Greece. There are no large squats or irregular settlements as in 
other parts of Italy and Europe. There are no clashes between migrants, activists and the 
police, such as those witnessed in Ventimiglia, at the Italy-France border. There is no overt 
and over-exploitation of the migrant labour force, including asylum seekers, akin to that 
observable in the fruit picking fields of northwest Italy, or in the tomato growing areas of the 
south. 
The 922 Nigerian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Gambian, and others, asylum seekers hosted in 
Macerata Province1  certainly do not experience the crisis in the same way as migrants in 
Bihac or Lesvos, or even fellow asylum seekers in reception centres in other parts of Italy. 
Rather, most commonly, after being offloaded from one of the boats involved in so-called 
Search and Rescue (SAR, henceforth) operations across the Mediterranean and spending 
some time in an identification centre, they enter the province in small groups, by bus, with 
local authorities informed in advance of their arrival. Once there, they benefit from a 
seemingly efficient and effective system of protection, whereby six accredited organisations 
work in coordination with the Prefettura (the provincially-decentralised office of the Interior 
Ministry) to house them in 65 mostly small reception centres across the province, and to offer 
them vocational training, cash and other allowances. As a seemingly “good” place to be an 
asylum seeker, the Macerata province seems indeed marginal to the crisis. 
Yet, even if some of the key forces and relations associated to such crisis are attenuated and 
less visible, their essential traits reverberate across the province, making Macerata an 
interesting vantage point to examine the crisis. Despite asylum seekers’ numbers being in line 
with the average recommended by the Government (2.5 per thousand citizens), their presence 
is perceived to be excessive by many. Some local administrations have refused to host them, 
accentuating tensions between national administrative levels, with region, provinces and 
municipalities often at odds with each other and with the central government over the 
(al)location and presence of asylum seekers, in ways that resemble the disputes among 
European member states. The economic crisis has further reduced the possibility of 
employment for everyone, and asylum seekers most often sit idle in the hotels and apartments 
that host them. Far right political groups are on the surge and episodes of racist violence are 
on the increase. Indeed, soon after the end of the field research informing this paper, news 
about an Italian man shooting indiscriminately at “black people” turned the spotlight on what 
had been considered, until then, a tranquil province and a relatively good example of asylum 
management, accentuating these latent tensions, and generating profound transformations in 
the way in which asylum seekers are managed in the province. 
What can be learned about the European migration crisis by studying it at its margins? 
At its broadest, the paper is informed by this question. It deploys the term crisis not to 
corroborate the by now discredited (Lindley, 2014; Mezzadra, 2015) narrative designating as 
a “crisis” the arrival in Europe of over four million asylum seekers since 20112, but rather to 
indicate an analytical direction: that of taking “note of the effects of the claim to crisis” 
(Roitman, 2013: 12; Dines et al., 2018). Specifically, the paper is concerned with the 
governance transformations engendered by such claim and, in turn, with their character. The 
paper examines these transformations from a relatively peripheral place like Macerata, in the 
conviction that Europe’s margins are key sites of investigation for analysing the “contested 
geographies” that these transformations engender (Painter et al., 2017: 260). 
On these bases, the paper develops an answer to the above question by taking as its object of 
analysis and investigation the Extraordinary Reception Centres (Centri Accoglienza 
Straordinaria, or CAS henceforth) set up in Macerata province to host asylum seekers, and 
by empirically mapping their location within the EU border regime and its governance. This 
mapping exercise is framed by Dikeç’s (2009) conceptualisation of the “where” of asylum, 
which he defines in relation to both the “legal spaces” (ibid: 183) and the “geographical 
location” (ibid: 188) where asylum takes place. It engages with contemporary debates on EU 
borders to a) highlight the centrality of marginal locations such as Macerata to the 
functioning of the EU border regime b) to intervene on debates concerned with the spatiality 
of EU borders and c) to evidence the neoliberal character of the governance transformations 
engendered by the crisis, beyond their migration management function. 
First, this mapping exercise expands literature on the humanitarian governance of EU 
borders, by focusing on asylum reception. The humanitarian reason (Fassin, 2012) 
increasingly deployed to manage undesirable populations (Agier, 2012) configures a dialectic 
of care and control (Pallister Wilkins, 2015) in which asylum is not just integral, but crucial 
to the governance of EU borders (Tsianos and Karakayali, 2010; Hess and Kasparek, 2017; 
Pinelli, 2017). Indeed, spaces of care are dialectically related to the exclusionary dimensions 
of the humanitarian border, as they jointly configure its governance (Williams, 2015).Yet 
asylum reception remains understudied (Cuttitta, 2017) in a field mostly concerned with 
exclusionary (e.g. detention facilities, see Mainwaring and Silverman, 2017) or filtering (e.g. 
hotspots, see Tazzioli, 2017) facilities, with the reassertion of “internal” EU borders 
(Lendaro, 2016), or with migrants’ autonomous trajectories within Europe (Davies et al., 
2017). Heeding Walters’ (2011) exhortation to undertake a fuller mapping of the 
humanitarian border, the paper expands this literature studying instead an institution (CAS) 
and a location (Macerata) where asylum takes place (at least in the meaning conferred to it by 
Italian law) rather than being denied. It shows that while CAS in Macerata may occupy a 
marginal position within a regime that is intent in dispersing and forcibly relocating migrants 
(Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018) or in denying them their right to seek asylum (Moreno Lax, 
2017), they are deeply integrated within it. Indeed, the paper argues that CAS are a central 
cog in the governance transformations engendered by the EU border regime as they provide a 
(legal and geographical) location where to warehouse asylum seekers, confirming the 
regime’s humanitarian pretences. 
Second, through this mapping exercise the paper intervenes in the debate about the 
spatialities of EU borders, arguing that greater awareness should be given to their territorial 
manifestations. Over the last decade and a half, contributions dissecting the spatiality of EU 
borders have convincingly captured the unprecedented process of externalisation (de Genova, 
2017; Andersson, 2014; Vives, 2017) that renders them mobile and itinerant (Casas Cortes et 
al., 2015). Detailing instead the extent to which the humanitarian management of EU borders 
generates governance transformations at national, regional, provincial and municipal levels, 
the paper builds upon these contributions, yet it underscores the centrality of linearly-defined 
national and sub-national jurisdictions. The spatiality of EU borders, it will be argued, is 
defined by both sets of dynamics -those that render them mobile and those that reinforce their 
linear inscription (Novak, 2017). 
Third, the paper points to the neoliberal character of the governance transformations 
engendered by the humanitarian management of EU borders. This character is evident in 
relation to the privatisation of reception functions (Darling, 2016) and the paper will highlight 
the significance of non-state contractors in defining the location of CAS. More 
fundamentally, however, this character is evident in relation to the governance mechanisms 
that define the location of CAS. Such mechanisms attempt to establish decentralised (Darling, 
2016) lean and efficiency-driven decision-making processes (Rondinelli and Cheema, 2003) 
that weaken public scrutiny (Bruf, 2017), that mobilise political threats to extend their reach 
across sub-national administrative jurisdictions (Allen and Cochrane, 2010), and that are 
variegated in their local configurations and effects (Peck and Tickell, 2002). Neoliberalism 
does not reduce, but rather transforms state intervention (Fine and Saad-Filho, 2017; see also 
Marois and Pradella, 2015). 
The paper argues that border management is an engine of state transformation. Its workings 
are not only dedicated to the neoliberal government of human mobility (de Genova, 2017), 
but also to the restructuring of the EU’s governance architecture and to the reconfiguration of 
member states’ institutional apparatuses along neoliberal lines. Highlighting the all- 
pervasiveness of neoliberalism, the paper evidences the weakening of democratic 
accountability associated to the governance transformations engendered by the crisis. It 
suggests, on these bases, that what can be learned about the European migration crisis by 
studying it at its margins, is that these transformations do not exclusively invest migrants, but 
rather migrants and non-migrants alike, offering two reflections in this respect. 
The paper pursues these arguments by mapping the location of CAS in Macerata province in 
three substantive sections. Following Dikeç’s (2009), Section 2 identifies the instruments that 
define the legal location of CAS within Italian law, while the following two sections map the 
geographical location of CAS within Macerata province. Section 3 is concerned with the 
centrally-orchestrated allocation mechanisms that regulate the intake of asylum seekers into 
Macerata, i.e. the demand for CAS in Macerata; Section 4 is concerned with the 
contestations, refusals, and co-optations that shape the supply of CAS across Macerata 
province, and, in turn, their exact geographical location. The final section sketches the many 
transformations that have taken place in Macerata since the summer of 2017 and returns to 
the points made here. 
 
 
The paper draws from two bouts of field research conducted in the Macerata province in 
2016 and 2017 (one and three months respectively). The first bout was concerned with 
identifying the most significant research questions emerging from that setting, amongst which 
location was a crucial one. The second one was concerned with interviewing relevant 
government officials and NGO workers managing the reception system, visiting CAS and 
engaging in daily discussions with asylum seekers hosted therein through focus groups or 
individually, conducting participant observation in sites such as police offices, bus stations, 
mobile phones and food shops, gardens and squares in Macerata. Overall, I conducted over 
50 interviews, visited 26 such centres, most of them several times, and collected copious 
notes of my visits, encounters and exchanges, all of which inform the following pages. At the 
time of writing (July 2018), I have returned to Macerata for a brief research follow-up, which 




2. The legal location of CAS 
“Either you shut the border, or you need to put them somewhere”. This is what the Social 
Services Director of the Macerata Prefettura told me, when I asked her about the opposition 
mounted by some municipal administrations in the territory under her jurisdiction to the 
arrival of asylum seekers in what they considered as their jurisdiction. No doubt the then 
Minister of Interior was actively engaged in the first part of the equation –the shutting of 
borders. Over the summer of 2017, Marco Minniti travelled to Libya to foster arrangements 
with the internationally recognised government and with other less-formally recognised 
groups in the Sahel region, with the objective of disrupting the routes that had taken over 
600thousand asylum seekers to Italian shores since 20113. By engaging with the second part 
of the equation, however, she was pointing to one of the EU border regime’s latent tensions. 
As many have argued (see above), the externalisation of border controls, opaque 
arrangements with third countries, and the military policing of the Mediterranean are only 
one dimension of such regime. The latter is not only concerned with the attempt to prevent 
migrants’ arrival, but it also ostensibly performs humanitarian functions through the reception 
of asylum seekers, in a dialectic of care and control that not only excludes, but also includes 
migrants in subordinate ways. Until the border is effectively shut, or until the violence of 
border management ceases to be couched in and sustained by humanitarian narratives of 
inclusion for “real” asylum seekers, migrants who reach European shores need to be located 
somewhere. But where? 
This section is concerned with the legal location of CAS, which are instituted in law by 
Decreto Legislativo 142/2015 (Legislative Decree, or D.Lgs henceforth). The latter, however, 
draws from and is sustained by multi-level sources of law. An excursus on the evolution of 
the legal instruments defining CAS is thus necessary to comprehend their legal location 
 
 
(Fig.1 provides a summary of the main legal instruments cited in this section). 
 
 
D.Lgs 142/2015 incorporates into Italian law the EU directive 2013/33/EU laying down 
minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, abrogates D.Lgs 140/2005 
incorporating the previous EU Directive 2003/9/EU, and introduces a series of innovations. 
The most important one, for the purposes of this article, is the institution of CAS, which 
formalises the inadequacy of the reception system defined by Law 189/2002. 
Law 189/2002 defined the “ordinary” reception system by modifying two previous laws 
concerned with the treatment of non-EU immigrants. First, it intervened on the dicta 
contained in D.Lgs 286/1998 (the Testo Unico, or Consolidated Law). The latter disciplined 
immigration and defined norms regarding the treatment of non-EU citizens and stateless 
persons. It was not directly concerned with asylum, yet it defined an architecture that remains 
valid to this day: it introduced the distinction between immigrants and asylum seekers; it 
instituted detention centres for specific categories of migrants; it instituted the permesso di 
soggiorno di carattere umanitario (residence permit for reasons of humanitarian protection), 
which is a national protection status, complementing two other forms of protection 
recognised at European level (i.e. refugee status and subsidiary protection4). Law 189/2002 
confirmed this architecture, while it modified the Testo Unico in a restrictive sense, for 
instance by reducing the maximum length of work-related residence permits to two years 
(art.5). 
Second, Law 189/2002 introduced procedural changes to Law 39/1990, which was more 
directly concerned with asylum procedures. It abrogated several commas from the latter’s 
art.1 (on “refugees”) and substituted them with a series of dispositions. Concerned with the 
instrumental use of asylum claims to gain access to Italian soil, Law 189/2002 distinguished 
between a simplified and an ordinary procedure for the adjudication of asylum claims. The 
former is applied to those that are in detention, and the law expands the range of cases where 
this may be required (art.32 1-bis). The latter is applied to all other cases, with Art. 31 
specifying that asylum claims are to be registered at the Questura (the provincially- 
decentralised office of the National Police), who then issues a residence permit to the asylum 
seeker until her claim is assessed. 
Furthermore, Law 189/2002 decentralised the adjudication of such claim to Commissioni 
Territoriali, an administrative body to be instituted by a Minister of Interior’s Decree. Prime 
Minister’s Decree 303/2004 provides the Regolamento Attuativo (implementation rules) for 
the Commissioni, instituting seven of them, and granting the Minister of Interior the authority 
to open and close further ones. The Law also sets temporal limits to their operations. 
Commissioni must grant an interview to the asylum seeker within 15 days (simplified 
procedure, art. 32 1-ter comma 2) or 30 days (ordinary procedure, 1-quater comma 2), and 
have three further days to adjudicate on her claim5. 
Law 189/2002, finally, instituted the Sistema di Protezione per Richiedenti Asilo e Rifugiati 
(Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees, or SPRAR henceforth), a network of 
reception facilities led by local administrations (municipalities), geared towards the 
integration of asylum seekers and refugees within the national territory and the provision of 
social services. SPRAR can and should be accessed by those following the ordinary 
procedure (art. 32 1-sexies), if considered in destitute conditions. 
The “ordinary” reception system for asylum seekers defined by Law 189/2002 is thus 
configured over two tiers. After an initial phase, which includes the lodging of an asylum 
claim and the issuance of a resident permit until the claim is resolved, the asylum seeker that 
is recognised as destitute by the Prefettura can access the full benefits of the reception 
system, subject to the availability of places in SPRAR, until the asylum claim is resolved. 
Such “ordinary” system was not able to withstand the force of migration. While between 
1997 and 2010 an average of 23 thousand asylum seekers arrived in Italy through irregular 
means, in 2008 the number stood at over 42 thousand, in 2011 at over 60 thousand, and 
between 2014 and 2016 estimated arrivals exceeded 150 thousand per year6. On one side, the 
Commissioni Territoriali did not have the capacity to process claims within the time limits set 
by law. On the other side, the SPRAR network never had enough places to accommodate 
such numbers. Their capacity stood at 7.823 in 2012, and it increased to only 34.039 by 2016 




Fig.1 around here 
 
 
D.Lgs 140/2005 (art. 6) confirmed that the certification of destitution should be sufficient 
condition to grant the asylum seeker access to SPRAR, but asserted that when places are 
unavailable, s/he should be hosted in first-tier identification centres, or, if places are 
unavailable there, the Prefettura should directly provide a subsistence contribution. It also 
envisaged a reception trajectory for asylum seekers that may take place prior to the 
registration of an asylum claim on the part of the migrant. Such trajectory would be governed 
by D.Lgs 451/1995, which authorised the military policing of the Apulian maritime border, 
and sanctioned, in situations of emergency connected to such operations, the establishment of 
three reception centres for destitute migrants in Apulia. The decree, however, also envisioned 
the opening of reception centres in other areas of Italy, where required, specifying that these 
centres can be instituted by Ministry of Interior decree, in accordance with the Treasury, but 
without the need to consult the Council of State, the body that ensures the legality of public 
administration in Italy. This reception trajectory was deployed in places like Macerata and 
later confirmed in the D.Lgs instituting CAS (see below). 
In the following years, the “ordinary” system continued to be under pressure. To prop it up 
the Ordinanza del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 3620/2007 (a Prime Ministerial 
Ordinance, or OPCM henceforth; an administrative act with normative force) expanded the 
number of Commissioni Territoriali, while the Minister of Interior Decree of 27 June 2007 
secured extra funding for local administrations engaged in SPRAR reception activities. In 
2009 and 2010, the relatively contained number of arrivals meant that the phenomenon could 
be managed through a series of ad-hoc Ministerial Decrees attributing specific competences 
to the Prefettura and Questura in the jurisdiction of migrants’ arrival7. What came to be 
known as the “Arab Spring” and the consequent arrival of several thousand migrants to 
Italian shores in 2011 profoundly altered the system. 
Prime Minister Decree of 12 February 2011 declared “the status of humanitarian emergency 
in relation to the territories of North Africa”. The decree marks the beginning of a new 
“emergency” phase in the reception system. This phase is marked, first, by changes in the 
procedures for the adjudication of protection status. Prime Minister’s Decree of 5 April 2011 
granted prima facie temporary protection status to all those who arrived from North Africa 
between 1 January and 5 April 2011, in the form of 6-months resident permits. This was 
complemented by Circolare Ministeriale (Ministerial Circular Order) 2290/2011, issued by 
the Ministry of Interior, which specified the correct procedure to implement the Prime 
Minister’s Decree. For instance, it specified that temporary protection status grants the right 
to travel across the Schengen area and that the residence permits to be issued should conform 
to EU Regulation 1030/2002. It also waved some of the documentation requirements to 
ascertain the nationality and identity of asylum seekers. 
Second, this phase is marked by the designation of a new coordinating authority. OPCM 
3933/2011 nominated the head of the Protezione Civile (a national agency under the direct 
authority of the Prime Minister’s Office) as the Commissioner in charge of dealing with the 
migration crisis. The agency was tasked with coordinating the activities of relevant ministries 
and local administrations, primarily at the Regional level, managed the budget dedicated to 
the emergency, and could issue its own decrees (under the authority of the Prime Minister). A 
flurry of decrees, memos, and ordinances regulate the response to the “emergency” during the 
following years8. Their purpose was to extend temporary protection statuses beyond the 
original six months, to detail and clarify operational and procedural matters, and to allocate 
funds needed to face the crisis (about twenty OPCMs concerned with expenditures were 
issued between February 2011 and April 20139). During 2012 the number of arrivals subsided 
compared to 2011, and Prime Minister Decree of 28 December 2012, issued by the then head 
of the Protezione Civile, “terminated” the emergency. 
The closure of the emergency phase meant that the overall coordination over asylum 
reception issues was restored under the Ministry of Interior. Circolare Ministeriale 
1424/2013, issued by the latter following a national coordination table with relevant national 
and sub-national administrative authorities, confirmed the end of the emergency phase, 
delegated its own Prefetture as the main operational body for asylum issues, and identified 
exit trajectories for the beneficiaries of temporary protection, primarily through voluntary 
repatriation programmes under the auspices of the IOM. Additionally, it granted each of 
those beneficiaries the sum of €500 and a travel document. The Circolare also effectively 
restored the “ordinary” system for asylum seekers’ reception, based on a first reception phase 
followed by SPRAR for those deemed destitute. Noting, however, that some municipalities 
had not honoured the commitment to host asylum seekers through the SPRAR network, it 
invited them to comply with the nationally agreed allocation plan (an initial indication of the 
tensions to be detailed in the next sections). 
Asylum seekers continued to arrive during this period, and some Prefetture engaged in ad hoc 
arrangements to obviate the unavailability of places in SPRAR. They were driven by factors 
such as availability of reception structures and cooperating NGOs. They were governed by 
the dicta contained in D.Lgs 451/1995. This was the case of Macerata (interviews with 
Prefettura and with Vice President of one NGO contractor). At the height of what is known as 
the “migration crisis” of 2015, the D.Lgs 142/2015 instituting CAS and mentioned at the 
beginning of this section formalises the inadequacy of Law 189/2002. 
The Decree institutes extraordinary reception centres (CAS), a third tier in the “ordinary” 
system. Art.11 (comma 1) re-states the Ministry’s commitment to the ordinary two-tier 
system, but sanctions that, in case of unavailability of places in the SPRAR network, or in 
centres opened according to D.Lgs 451/1995, Prefetture can institute CAS in the territory 
under their jurisdiction, until places in ordinary structures can be found. 
CAS are thus located within a framework that is sustained by and draws its normative force 
from navigating across and between multi-level legal jurisdictions and sources of law. It is a 
framework that builds upon a consolidated institutional apparatus (e.g. the Testo Unico), that 
appeals to laws promulgated in relation to specific circumstances (e.g. D.Lgs 451/1995) and 
combines their dicta with those contained in others (e.g. EU Directive in reception standards, 
Law 225/1992), to produce new dispositions and arrangements. It navigates “upwards”, 
towards the supra-national level, by drawing principles from international obligations, by 
working in coordination with UN agencies such as UNHCR and the IOM, or by referring to 
and incorporating EU directives and regulations. It also navigates “downwards”, towards the 
sub-national level, by specifying and altering functions and procedures of Prefetture and 
Questure, or by instituting administrative bodies such as Commissioni Territoriali. It 
sanctions procedures and specifies the content of law via Circolari, Ordinanze or 
Regolamenti Attuativi, administrative acts issued by the government or by Ministries, 
possessing normative force (see Law 400/1988, art. 17). 
This understanding of the legal location of CAS, first, confirms their centrality within EU 
border management. As stated by the official from the Prefettura quoted earlier, the shutting 
of borders is only one side of the equation and finding a (legal, in this case) location where to 
warehouse asylum seekers arriving in Italy is equally important. The legal location of CAS 
confirms and conforms with the stated governmental policy of combining actions aimed at 
the integration and reception of asylum seekers with policies aimed at contrasting clandestine 
immigration10. While the former dimension is comparatively salient in the Italian case (see 
Cheliotis, 2017; Papoutsi et al., 2018 for a comparison with Greece, and Squire et al., 2017, 
for a European-level study), it cannot be considered in isolation from the more violent forms 
of humanitarian border management (Pinelli, 2017, Cuttitta, 2017). CAS are an expression of 
the dialectic of care and control (Agier, 2012; Pallister-Wilkins, 2017) characteristic of the 
humanitarian management of EU borders. 
Second, this understanding complicates Dikeç’s (2009) dichotomy between spaces of law and 
of lawlessness. CAS do not appear as spaces of lawlessness created by law, in the way in 
which he describes, for instance, offshore processing centres. In replicating ambiguities 
typical of the process of incorporation of EU directives into national legislation (see Peers et 
al., 2015), their operations are never formally outside the law. Rather, D.Lgs 142/2015 
connects and reinforces nodes of governance (see Papoutsi et al., 2018), it re-works the 
relative significance of national and sub-national agencies, authorities and centres of power, 
while confirming the territorially nested nature of these jurisdictions and sources of law. 
Rather than a space of law/lawlessness, the location of CAS seems to be an expression of the 
‘contested geographies’ that the political transformations associated to the migration crisis 
have engendered (Painter et al., 2017). 
This understanding is also a first indication of the neoliberal character of these 
transformations. For example, the extensive use of Circolari characterising Italy’s approach 
to the governance of migration (Gjergji, 2013) is said to have produced a flexible, lean and 
efficiency-driven governance approach to migration resembling that of a private corporation 
and conferring salience to executive and administrative bodies in the definition of migration 
and asylum policies and practices (Gjerji, 2018). Similarly, the designation of irregular 
migration as an emergency, characteristic of the management of asylum in Italy for almost 
two decades, mobilises external threats to foster governance changes. Law 225/1992, which 
grants the government extraordinary powers whenever this is required by the intensity or 
extension of natural calamities, catastrophes or other events, informs Law 189/2002 defining 
the “ordinary” system and has recurred in all subsequent migration-related executive 
decisions and Decrees since then. This constitutes what some have called the 
institutionalisation of a “structural emergency”, a practice that configures the management of 
asylum seekers in problematic ways as it eliminates public scrutiny over the disbursement of 
resources (Vrenna and Biondi dal Monte, 2011). Such practice also alters, in fact it 
“compresses”, the relative autonomy of local administrations (ibid), as discussed in the 
following two sections. 
 
 
3. Allocating asylum seekers to CAS in Macerata 
“We face daily arrivals in this period. We get a phone call from the Ministry or the Prefettura 
of migrants’ arrival telling us that X number of persons will arrive tonight. We call NGOs 
and the machine starts”. This is how Social Services Director of the Macerata Prefettura 
explained to me the arrival of over 90 asylum seekers during the weekend, a ten per cent 
increase in the total stock. The previous week (10 to 15 July 2017), news bulletins reported 
the interception of 2500 asylum seekers in the Mediterranean, some of whom made their way 
to Macerata. Why there, though? 
The previous section discussed the institutional framework used to locate within the law 
those asylum seekers exceeding the “ordinary” reception system’s capacity. Yet this is only 
part of the governance problem engendered by the crisis, as those same asylum seekers, in 
their embodied connotation, need to be physically located somewhere. There are 65 CAS in 
Macerata province (see Fig.2) and over 3000 across Italy11, and this section identifies the 
governance mechanism that define their allocation to this province. It foregrounds different 
territorially-inscribed and nested administrative jurisdictions, all of which are invested by the 
EU border regime. 
Most asylum seekers hosted in Macerata’s CAS at the time of field research were 
disembarked in an Italian port after being intercepted in the central Mediterranean in the 
context of SAR operations. The latter are variously performed by military vessels involved in 
humanitarian border management operations, humanitarian NGOs, and “accidental 
humanitarians” such as crews of cargo vessels (Stierl, 2018: 704). Once disembarked, they 
had the strength of mind to tick the right box in the questionnaire they would have been asked 
to fill, enquiring, amongst other things, about the reasons for their presence in Italy. By 
ticking the right box, they were presumed to be in Italy to seek asylum, a crucial presumption 
that would have regularised their stay on Italian soil. This presumption, also and 
simultaneously, prevented them from seeking asylum anywhere else in Europe. The 
transformation of an “irregular migrant” into an “asylum seeker in Italy” is thus framed by 
two sets of regulations concerned with the production and modulation of European space, and 
their evolution over the last three decades (see Campesi, 2015), and connecting the external 
and internal management of EU borders. 
This transformation is framed, first, by regulations concerned with the military patrolling and 
the reinforcement of the EU Mediterranean border. EUNAVFOR MED’s Operation Sophia is 
a military operation that began in 2015 with the explicit objective of contrasting human 
smuggling and trafficking. It is part of a broader range of initiatives aimed at reinforcing EU 
borders, which include bilateral and regional agreements and initiatives (Pinelli, 2017). It 
replaced the Italian Navy’s Operation Mare Nostrum (running between late 2013 and 2014), 
which instead had as its explicit mission the rescuing of migrants at sea (see Tazzioli, 2015; 
Heller et al., 2014; Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018 for more detailed accounts of this evolution). 
Mare Nostrum operations were terminated amidst disputes between Italy and the EU over 
“burden sharing” (Bevilacqua, 2017). These disputes were not only about the sharing of costs 
involved, or EU’s pressures on Italy to transpose asylum Directives (Zaun, 2016). They most 
profoundly revolved around the responsibilities to process asylum seekers and to Italy’s 
“disinclination to fingerprint and assist rescued migrants once disembarked, thereby enabling 
their further movement across EU space” (Heller and Pezzani, 2016, unpaginated; see also 
Cuttitta, 2014; Tazzioli, 2015). 
Second, while SAR procedures transform Italian ports into the most likely place of 
disembarkment for migrants intercepted in the central Mediterranean, EU Regulation 
604/2013 (aka Dublin 3) transforms Italy into the “first country of asylum”, therefore 
responsible to adjudicate on the claim and to host asylum seekers until the process of 
adjudication is complete. Dublin regulations confine asylum seekers disembarked in Italy 
within Italian soil. They are invoked to deny access to or to push back into Italy those who 
attempt to make their way north, in places like Ventimiglia and Como, at EU’s internal 
borders. They are also used to return to Italy those migrants who have “left their finger in 
Sicily”, as two asylum seekers who had been caught by police in Northern Europe described 
the compulsory fingerprinting they were subjected to upon disembarkment. 
The transformation of EU member states’ sovereign privileges and duties, their external 
projections and the re-working of jurisdictions at sea, as much as the processes transforming 
southern European countries into an EU internal containment rung associated to these 
regulations (see also European Commission, 2015) have already been successfully dissected 
(Heller and Pezzani, 2014; Kasparek, 2015; Stierl, 2017; to name a few), and do not need to 
be revisited here. What is perhaps less dissected is how, once confined in Italy by such 
regulations, “asylum seekers in Italy” are dispersed into CAS throughout its territory. Here 
numerous other sites of institutional bargaining and contestations appear, at each of the 
governance levels defining the Italian state’s territorially-inscribed administrative structure, 
made up of Regions, Provinces and municipalities. Much like in relation to the previous 




Fig. 1 Map of the Macerata province. The red-shaded area identifies the provincial jurisdiction. Stars identify the location of 65 CAS present in the province. 
The majority are apartments in and around Macerata city, which at this scale cannot be clearly identified. I visited 26 CAS, of which three outside the province, 






Indeed, in parallel to the proliferation of legislative measures described in the previous 
section, the (claim to) crisis engendered a series of governance transformations aimed at 
defining the allocation of asylum seekers across the Italian territory. In July 2014, the 
government summoned representatives of regions and local administrations to a “Unified 
Conference”, a legally-sanctioned national coordinating table with the function of defining 
Intese, i.e. binding understandings concerned with the harmonisation of national and regional 
laws, the definition of common positions, and the attainment of common objectives. The 
Conference devised the first National Plan to deal with the extraordinary influx of asylum 
seekers, an attempt to move out of the “emergency” phase of 2011/12 described in the 
previous section, and to establish a governance system cutting across all administrative 
levels. 
The Plan defined procedures and coordinating mechanisms for the allocation of asylum 
seekers to each Italian Region taking into consideration proposals by the association of Italian 
municipalities (ANCI) and other such bodies, and asserting the principle of “diffuse 
reception”, i.e. the dispersal of asylum seekers across administrative jurisdictions. Such 
system would be based on a fair and honest cooperation between administrative levels, 
which, in practice, meant using social services’ transfers from the central government to each 
Region as allocation criteria. The Marche region, for example, would receive 265 asylum 
seekers per 10,000 to be allocated, as it drew 2.65% of the total government transfers. The 
Lombardia region, drawing the largest share of such transfers at 14.15%, would host 1.415 
asylum seekers per 10.000 arrivals (Ministero dell’Interno, 2016). 
Further down the administrative structure, the Plan envisaged Regional Coordinating Tables, 
with representatives of regions, provinces and municipalities, with the objective of 
implementing locally the nationally agreed strategy. It also attributed competences to 
Prefetture in the regional capital (Prefettura of Ancona, in the Marche case) to activate 
coordinating mechanisms for the allocation of the regional quota of asylum seekers across 
each province. In the Marche region, for instance, allocation quotas across Provinces were 
established using a criterion that combined the share of funds drawn by each province from 
the regionally-disbursed EU Social Fund (a fund that promotes occupational opportunities 
and industrial development), and the number of residents in each province. On these bases, 
Ancona would be allocated 28% of the regional quota of asylum seekers, Ascoli Piceno 13%, 
Fermo 11%, Pesaro Urbino 25%, and Macerata 23% (interview, Prefettura Ancona ). 
The Plan drawn was successful in achieving its stated aims on several counts. First, its 
principles were reiterated and adopted in D.Lgs142/2015 (art.16), the one establishing CAS 
mentioned in the previous section. Second, it centrally orchestrated a lean coordinating 
mechanism to govern the allocation of asylum seekers across the 20 Italian regions, which 
effectively reduced the pressure on regions of first arrival. For instance, in December 2013 
Sicily hosted 42% of the total number of asylum seekers, but this share diminished to 13% by 
December 2015. During the same period, regions like Veneto and Toscana, which hosted 1% 
of the total, or Lombardia 2%, saw their share increasing to 9%, 8% and 14% respectively 
(Ministero dell’Interno, 2016). Indeed, by 2016 the share of transfers from the central social 
services fund to each region and the share of asylum seekers hosted in each region effectively 
mirrored each other, as hoped for in the Plan. 
Third, such coordinating mechanism was also flexible and functioned as an important relay to 
adjust the allocation of asylum seekers, both upwards and downwards, a demonstration of the 
integrated nature of EU border management apparatus across governance levels. Upwards, 
i.e. from the provincial level to the Ministry of Interior, specific territorial contingencies were 
taken into consideration and used to adjust criteria. In the case of the Marche region, this 
most notably refers to the earthquake of 2016, because of which no asylum seekers would be 
allocated to three provinces for several months (interview, Prefettura Ancona). Downwards, 
i.e. from the Ministry of Interior to the provincial level, the coordinating mechanisms devised 
by the Plan would work to relay EU Decisions. This was so, for instance in relation to 
“relocation quotas” (Ministero dell’Interno, 2016). The latter were sanctioned by the no- 
longer-in-force EU Council Decisions 1523/2015 and1601/2015, which affirmed that several 
thousand migrants in clear need of protection would be relocated from Italy to the territory of 
the other Member States. This Decisions shaped allocation procedures in relation to the 
choice of port of disembarkation for ships involved in SAR operations, or preferential 
allocation channels opened for asylum seekers of nationalities that could qualify for 
relocation (ibid., pp. 14-18). 
Performatively, furthermore, the Plan was also successful in asserting the authority of the 
Ministry of Interior in asylum matters across the Italian territory and vis-à-vis the EU and its 
“neighbourhood”. If on one side, the Ministry was actively involved in the disruption of 
migration routes and the externalisation of the EU border (see above) and in negotiating the 
implementation of relocation quotas at EU level, on the other side, its executive decisions 
were ever more engrained across administrative levels. The national coordinating table 
expressed through the Unified Conference would draw a Plan, which would be implemented 
by regional coordinating tables whose authority is vested in the Ministry of Interior’s 
provincially-decentralised Prefetture, with all decisions and procedures sanctioned by 
Ministerial decree, within the parameters set by EU directives (see also Circolare Ministero 
dell’Interno 11 October 2016). 
The Plan, however, was far less successful in getting municipalities involved. The principle 
of “diffuse reception”, the definition of regional allocation quotas, and the decentralisation of 
decisions regarding provincial allocations to Prefetture in the regional capital, in fact, does 
not force municipalities to actively engage in the reception of asylum seekers. The SPRAR 
network is led and managed by municipalities, and functions on an exclusively voluntary 
basis. Municipalities can be encouraged and Prefetture engage with them in a daily and 
capillary process of concertazione (bargaining), dialogue and participation (SPRAR, 2017: 
33), a testimony of their increased territorial engagement and pivotal role. Municipalities are 
also incentivised through monetary compensations, as per Law 193/2016, which envisages 
fiscal contributions for local administrations opening SPRAR, including a €500 bonus per 
year per migrant, without restrictions on spending (i.e. with funds not tied to migrant-related 
expenditures). Finally, the 2016 National Allocation Plan (see Circolare Ministero 
dell’Interno 11 October 2016) offers municipalities a so-called “safeguard clause”, which 
exempts them from having to host CAS instituted by the Prefetture, if they voluntarily host 
asylum seekers through SPRAR. Seen in the opposite direction, the clause also implies that 
municipalities that, for whatever reason, are unwilling or unable to open SPRAR may have 
CAS instituted by the Prefettura in their territory. Indeed, as per D.Lgs 142/2015 Prefetture 
can institute CAS through public tenders with municipalities only notified. 
This implies that the Ministry of Interior’s provincially-decentralised territorial manifestation, 
i.e. the Prefettura, acquires a central role in the management of asylum-related matters, to the 
detriment of parliament’s and municipalities’ oversight. The co-ordinating mechanisms 
devised by the Plan mirror the transformations discussed in the previous section with regards 
to the legal location of CAS, as they seem to operationalize a condition of “structural 
emergency” whereby the executive can define dispositions and procedures regarding CAS 
without them being examined by parliamentarians. For sure, the Parliament exercises overall 
control on the reception system through a Parliamentary Commission12, yet this control 
seems diluted in relation to CAS. The monitoring functions performed by the Commission 
happen ex-post, through visits and the acquisition of relevant information from regional and 
provincial state bodies, but they are set against a highly dynamic and fluid context. 
Furthermore, monitoring is mostly concerned with the material living conditions inside CAS 
and with expenditures. In relation to their location, the main concern of this article, finally, 
albeit the Commission emphasises the need to move beyond an emergency approach to 
reception, it does not question the need for CAS. In fact, one of its Rapports13 simply restates 
norms contained in D.Lgs 142/2015 regarding the powers of the Prefettura to institute them. 
Similarly, this makes the Prefetture much more assertive in its relations with administrative 
branches of the state, such as municipalities and their (elected) mayors and councils. As a 
member of Ancona Prefect’s Cabinet told me: “The role of Prefettura is indeed increasing. 
The malicious say that it was only thanks to migrants that we still have a job, otherwise we 
would have disappeared. Truth is that I was quite busy even before, but for sure now I am 
constantly involved in activities, discussions and decisions. I tour municipalities every day 
and engage with them constantly”. While this statement should be set against the attempts to 
abolish the role and competences of provinces as an administrative level of the Italian state14, 
the statement suggests the extent to which provinces have become a crucial governance level 
in the functioning of the EU border regime, the lowest administrative rung of an ever-more 
integrated border management system. 
Put differently and drawing a parallel from the discussion in the previous section, while the 
Plan configures the “ordinary” allocation mechanism for dispersing asylum seekers across 
Italian regions and provinces and relies on a voluntary adherence on the part of municipalities 
to become fully effective, CAS function as the extraordinary valve that provides the 
conditions of possibility for asylum seekers to be dispersed across Italian provinces when the 
ordinary mechanism is unable to. This is clearly not a smooth process, as discussed next. 
 
 
4. Locating CAS 
“It is not possible for a representative of the state, because this is what a Mayor is, to make 
such statements”. This was the reaction of the Director Social Services of Macerata Prefettura 
to reports that the mayor of the municipality of Ussita was opposed to the arrival of 25 
asylum seekers, in August 2016. A few days earlier I had visited the town and the hotel 
where these persons were supposed to be hosted. There, I interviewed the director of the 
organisation that was supposed to host them, a self-styled “humanitarian entrepreneur” who 
also managed a CAS in a northern Italian town. Earlier that year, he had won the Bando 
(public tender) for the “reception and assistance of non-EU foreigners seeking asylum in 
centres within the Macerata province to be identified by the organisations participating in 
the tender” organised by the Prefettura di Macerata15, which regulates the activities of 
contractors in charge of managing asylum seekers in the province. The arrival of the 25 
asylum seekers, however, was delayed by a suspected arson attack that damaged the 
mattresses and rooms of the hotel he had rented to conduct his humanitarian business. When I 
visited the hotel, the renovation was complete, but their arrival was further delayed, at least 
according to the entrepreneur, by a road blockage planned by residents to prevent them from 
reaching the (quite remote) town. He was engaged in discussion with the mayor, and so was 
the Prefettura, with one of its representatives expected over the following days. The standoff 
involving the territorial manifestation of the Italian government, a locally-elected mayor, 
segments of the population of Ussita and neighbouring towns, and a businessman involved in 
asylum provisions was, ultimately and tragically, resolved by the earthquake that destroyed 
the town, in October of that year. 
Still, such standoff is not an isolated incident, and I recorded similar instances in my field 
notes. The arrival of 12 asylum seekers in Villa Potenza, for example, was strongly ostracised 
by the local administration, and, post-arrival, such opposition was rendered concrete by some 
residents through everyday forms of racisms. In anticipation of the arrival of about 40 asylum 
seekers in a church-owned building in a remote fraction of the municipality of Treia, 
residents summoned the bishop to plead with him for this to stop. The mayor of Sarnano 
successfully managed to reduce by six (from 37 to 31) the number of asylum seekers hosted 
in a hotel in his town, because 31 was the number sanctioned in the Bando (even if the Bando 
allows a variation from the original number). 
This section is concerned with understanding what shapes the exact location of CAS across 
municipalities in the Macerata province. By socially situating decisions about the opening of 
a CAS in one or the other municipality, it unearths the contestations, negotiations and co- 
options associated to them, and highlights the centrality of contractors in shaping such 
geographies. 
Fig. 3 lists, respectively by column, all the municipalities in the province, their resident 
population, the target number of asylum seekers per municipality (based on a per thousand 
population ratio) proposed by the Association of Italian Municipalities (ANCI) and adopted 
by the latest National Allocation Plan, and the presence of migrants in extra-ordinary and 
ordinary reception centres (CAS and SPRAR) as of 15 June 2017. In the last column, it 
evidences the difference between target and actual numbers. A negative number means that 
the municipality hosts more asylum seekers than those expected according to the allocation 
criteria, while a positive number demonstrates the opposite. 
 
The table, first, confirms the significance of CAS compared to the ordinary SPRAR centres, 
also at this administrative level of data collection. Much like in the rest of Italy, CAS are 
central to the system. As of 15 July 2017, 77.4% of the over 205thousand asylum seekers in 
Italy were hosted in CAS, with only 15.3% of them in SPRAR, and the remaining in first tier 
centres (SPRAR, 2017). In Macerata province this percentage is even higher, with 86.5% of 
asylum seekers hosted in CAS. Second, the table illustrates how very few municipalities 
adhere to the National Allocation Plan, and a large proportion does not have any asylum 
seekers’ presence. This also seems to be the case across Italy, where only 40.5% of 
municipalities hosts asylum seekers or refugees in their administrative territory (SPRAR, 
2017). Third, the table, perhaps paradoxically, also displays a few “outperformers”, i.e. 
municipalities hosting well above the quota that is expected of them. More broadly, the 
unevenness of CAS across the province’s municipalities indicates that the Prefettura’s 
decision to institute them does not strictly follow an allocation model premised on the Plan 
discussed above. Why are CAS where they are? 
First, decisions about the location of CAS across municipalities are guided by policy debates. 
According to interviews, the Prefettura pursues the principle of diffuse reception and aims at 
dispersing asylum seekers across the provincial territory, guided by the allocation Plan 
defined in the previous section. At the same time, it would prefer asylum seekers to be hosted 
in towns, as opposed to across the mostly rural territory, so they can better learn Italian and 
can more easily find work. It would also prefer centres hosting 30 to 40 asylum seekers, as 
opposed to small ones, so that services could be delivered to them more efficiently, without 
organisations running across the province to deliver such services. This seems difficult to 
achieve in most towns, given their size, and thus perhaps contradictory to the first point. 
Furthermore, each of Prefettura contractors, i.e. the NGOs, church-based cooperatives and 
for-profit organisations that have won the public tender, seem to be guided by other concerns 
and to pursue different policies. Some of them think that having asylum seekers in small 
towns may provoke negative reactions from residents. For them, it is better to have them 
dispersed across the provincial territory. For others, on the contrary, asylum seekers represent 
an opportunity to repopulate small towns whose resident population have been steadily 
declining. Others say it is not their problem to sort out the Prefettura’s contradictions, 
especially since they are pushed to accept more and more asylum seekers. The latter prefer 
small centres near their main office to establish a daily contact and dialogue with 
beneficiaries. 
Second, decisions regarding the presence/absence of CAS at the level of each municipality 
are more fine-grained. In some cases, such as Tolentino, their absence should be explained by 
reference to the earthquake and the fact that existing structures had to be evacuated. In other 
cases, as exemplified at the beginning of this section, their absence seems to be a direct 
consequence of the oppositional stance taken by elected local administrations and their 
constituencies. The case of “outperformers” could instead be explained by considering the 
location of CAS within each municipality’s administrative territory. In three such 
municipalities (Montecassiano, Treia and Loro Piceno), CAS are far removed from the main 
town, albeit still within the municipality’s jurisdiction. One hotel in Montecassiano, for 
example, hosts over 70 asylum seekers, yet nowhere near the actual town. This is even more 
the case in Treia, where the five CAS hosting between 20 and 40 asylum seekers each are 
dispersed across the administrative territory’s periphery, far away from the town’s centre. In 
Loro Piceno, the hotel hosting over 100 asylum seekers and the largest CAS in the province, 
is located near the main provincial road, removed from the picturesque town, which is instead 
perched up the hill. In the case of Civitanova Marche, the second largest town in the 
Province, the absence of asylum seekers could be explained by a combination of factors. 
Rents tend to be higher, especially so after the earthquake which saw many residents of 
affected areas move closer to the sea. The director of one of the largest NGOs told me instead 
that for them, this was a strategic choice. The pre-existing presence of criminal groups whose 
nationality is the same as that of most of the asylum seekers they host meant that, for them, 
“establishing a CAS there would have asylum seekers walk straight into the mafia, and they 
would immediately be perceived as pushers”. Church-based groups, very active in the asylum 
system across Italy, would instead explain this in relation to the differently-configured 
territoriality of the archdioceses. While Civitanova Marche is indeed in the Macerata 
province, it falls under the jurisdiction of the Archdioceses of Fermo, the province south of 
Macerata, and most of their activities are concentrated there, where they host about 120 
asylum seekers. For other persons interviewed, this is an “efficiency” question. Civitanova is 
too far from Macerata to make it efficient for organisations based in the provincial capital. 
While insightful in relation to presence/absence of CAS in each municipality, none of these 
situated rationales holds the ground at provincial level. The conditions of possibility that 
allow some municipalities and not others to mount a seemingly successful resistance against 
the Prefettura’s process of concertazione are not clear. Many CAS are isolated and/or small, 
certainly not within “efficient reach” from Macerata. The church owes buildings in almost 
every town and yet not all of them host asylum seekers. The landscape of the province, which 
sees towns usually located on hilltops and surrounded by large cultivated fields punctuated by 
farmhouses, would allow for the territorial gamesmanship described above being more 
frequent. Many CAS are in or nearby the centre of towns. Most CAS are apartments in 
Macerata town (47 out of 65 CAS), albeit these apartments only host 30% of the total of 
asylum seekers in the province16. 
Third, a more systemic explanation emerging strongly from accounts recorded points to the 
availability of rural houses, hotels and apartments for the purposes of hosting asylum seekers. 
As per the Bando regulating the activities of contractors, in fact, it is the responsibility of 
participating organisations to identify a suitable building. Contractors are those who seek 
places where to host asylum seekers, those who rent accommodation from willing landlords, 
and those who, on those bases, participate in the public tender. This opens a whole new set of 
explanations, different from those delineated so far, which decisively contributes to explain 
the location of CAS across municipalities. 
As recorded in my field notes, church-based groups usually have their own buildings, while 
NGOs and for-profit contractors must rent them. For larger organisations this may not be a 
problem, as they are able to offer secure and long-term contracts and bank guarantees, but 
smaller ones face more hurdles. Local contractors are at an advantage vis-à-vis those coming 
from other regions of Italy, let alone from abroad, as they have better knowledge of the 
territory and can more easily mobilise their networks. Some of the for-profit organisations 
(humanitarian entrepreneurs) may be looking for the cheapest accommodation, regardless of 
the policy criteria detailed above. In some towns, the opposition to the arrival of asylum 
seekers translates in houses not being made available for the purposes of hosting asylum 
seekers, despite the ‘for rent’ signs visible in their streets. Many landlords, on the contrary, 
call NGOs to offer them buildings, most often located in remote corners of the Province. The 
same do some Hotel owners, whose business in many cases seems to survive only thanks to 
their renting rooms for the purposes of hosting asylum seekers. As put by the Director Social 
Services of the Macerata Prefettura: “The location of centres is premised on the availability 
of each organisation. Every day we receive from them the number of available places and we 
communicate it to the Ministry, which has an updated picture of available places across 
Italy”. 
Indeed, while the previous section identified the top-down centrally-orchestrated institutional 
mechanisms that shape the location of CAS from the EU level down to provincial 
administrative jurisdictions, this section has offered instead a bottom up explanation of their 
location. The latter is centred on fluid and situated social processes of contestation, co- 
optation and bargaining, which continue to see the Prefettura in a pivotal role, but at the same 
time de-centre decisions about and privatise the dynamics that explain the ‘where’ of asylum. 
On one side, these processes confirm the nested and peripheral nature of provincial-level 
asylum dynamics, as they strictly unfold within the parameters set by the institutional 
mechanisms defined in the previous sections. On the other side, by providing a physical 
location where to warehouse asylum seekers, they resolve the tensions associated to the 
humanitarian dimensions of EU border management, thus sustaining the latter’s exclusionary 
violence. The dialectic of care and control expressed by the humanitarian management of EU 
borders, which transforms irregular migrants intercepted in the Mediterranean into “asylum 
seekers in Italy”, makes the provincial level a crucial one, as this is where the tension 
associated to such dialectic are finally resolved. This is what makes provincial-level asylum 
dynamics central to such management’s functioning. 
 
 
5. The neoliberal location of asylum 
Returning to Macerata in July 2018 much seems to have changed. This was to be expected 
considering the events of 3 February 2018, when an Italian man shot six black persons, 
apparently enraged by the murder of an Italian woman a few weeks earlier (committed, 
allegedly, by two Nigerian men). These events uncovered a latent discontent amongst the 
population and produced a backlash against migrants, especially those of African origin, with 
racist abuses becoming (even more) widespread, and put the spotlight on the Prefettura 
contractors, accused of enriching themselves by hosting an ever-increasing number of asylum 
seekers. It also produced changes in the reception system. After the shooting, the Prefect of 
Macerata wrote a formal note to the Ministry of Interior requesting to stop the allocation of 
asylum seekers to the Province, and no new arrivals have been recorded since then. On 5 
March 2018, the municipality of Macerata invoked the safeguard clause and, consequently, 
all CAS in Macerata town were closed, bar a very limited number hosting unaccompanied 
minors and families. “This is not what the safeguard clause is meant to do”, an official in the 
Prefettura told me. The municipality had in fact expanded the number of SPRAR facilities 
just a few months earlier taking into consideration the presence of asylum seekers in CAS. “If 
anything, they should have invoked it then”. Those that were hosted in a CAS in Macerata 
were relocated to other such facilities throughout the province. Many asylum seekers have 
left the province without waiting for their claim to be adjudicated upon by the Commissione 
and attempting to make their way to other parts of Europe. The 468 asylum seekers that 
remain in the 37 still functioning CAS, spend their days inside them, daring a trip to Macerata 
town only every so often to buy food or to recharge their phone, and then swiftly returning 
‘home’. 
These dynamics somewhat anticipated broader transformations in the EU border regime. 
Compared to the previous year, the overall number of irregular arrivals has decreased by 
25%, at European level in the first quarter of 201817, and by 80% in Italy in the first six 
months of 201818. The newly installed (April 2018) Italian government closed its ports to 
humanitarian NGOs and attempted to deny access to vessels involved in Operation Sophia, 
unleashing disputes amongst various ministries (Interior, Foreign Affairs, Infrastructure) over 
who can or cannot deny access to Italian ports, and amongst EU member states over SAR 
procedures. The Minister of Interior issued a directive in June 2018 inviting Commissioni 
Territoriali to operate with more rigour and scrupulousness in the adjudication of asylum 
claims and to take into consideration the interests of Italians at the same time as those of 
asylum seekers. The Prefect acting as President of the National Commissione Territoriale, 
which exercises orientation and coordination functions, followed on from this directive, 
inviting the presidents of the various Commissioni Territoriali through a formal note issued 
on 13 July 2018 to reduce the number of humanitarian protection status awarded to asylum 
seekers. This contravenes the legally-sanctioned principle of individual examination of 
asylum claims and was fiercely opposed by many19. Another directive issued by the Minister 
of Interior on 23 July 2018 indicates that further changes in the reception system are to be 
expected. These changes will be aimed at a rationalisation of reception facilities motivated by 
cost reductions and efficiency. Meanwhile, as of 12 July, the number of recorded deaths in 
the Mediterranean in 2018 has reached 1422. 
These two sets of dynamics overlap. Both evidence the perpetuation of violent and 
exclusionary forms of border management and a decreasing relevance of humanitarianism in 
the management of EU borders (Campesi, 2018), a recalibration of the kinds of activity that 
are feasible and appropriate for nonmarket institutions to engage in (Bruf, 2017), and a set of 
contestations (Painter et al., 2017). This overlap is not coincidental. Indeed, the above 
analysis proceeded on the conviction that the relatively peripheral nature of places like 
Macerata does not make them less significant to capture broader transformations within the 
EU border regime. On the contrary, these marginal places offer great analytical insights on 
the monumental political transformations that are investing Europe as a result of the 
migration crisis (Painter et al., 2017); or, at least, of the claim to crisis (Roitman, 2013). 
Based on this conviction, the three substantive sections of the paper mapped the location of 
CAS within EU border management, hoping to gain insights on the character of these 
transformations. The mapping exercise built upon and complicated Dikeç’s (2009) 
understanding of the “where” of asylum. Section 2 was concerned with the legal location of 
CAS, and identified the European Directives, Italian laws, Ministerial Decrees and executive 
orders that define the location of CAS within Italian law. It illustrated the multi-level 
jurisdictions and sources of law that sustain the Decree instituting CAS and in so doing, it 
suggested that while confirming the territorially nested nature of these jurisdictions, the 
Decree also creates new governance nodes and assemblages (see Papoutsi et al., 2018). The 
following two sections mapped the geographical location of CAS within the Macerata 
province, and explained it as the result of a double pressure. From the top down, Section 3 
identified the institutional mechanisms that respond to the need to allocate, across Europe and 
Italy, those irregular migrants that reach European soil. From the bottom up, Section 4 
provided a series of socially situated and contextual explanations, which ultimately seem to 
revolve around the availability of structures that can be used for the purposes of hosting 
asylum seekers. 
All three sections confirm the centrality of CAS in Macerata within the humanitarian 
management of EU borders. Both legally and geographically, CAS offer an “extraordinary” 
location where to warehouse asylum seekers in excess of the “ordinary” system’s capacity. 
As an institutional location developed to obviate the inadequacy of previous laws concerned 
with the reception of asylum seekers and as a geographical location where to host asylum 
seekers in their embodied connotations, CAS are an integral component of the dialectic of 
care and control that characterises the humanitarian management of EU borders; in fact, a 
crucial one that allows to maintain the humanitarian pretences of the EU border regime, 
resolving one of its latent tensions. 
All three sections, furthermore, confirm the need to increase analytical awareness towards the 
territoriality of the EU border regime. Over the last few years much attention has, correctly, 
been devoted to processes of externalisation and to the mobility of EU borders, yet far less 
scrutiny has been devoted to the ways in which the EU border regime configures itself 
territorially. The previous analysis has demonstrated the significance of territorially-nested 
jurisdictions for the functioning of such regime. This is so, perhaps evidently, in relation to 
the legal location of CAS, whose normative content is framed by, appeals to and reworks 
international, bilateral and national sources of law, thus confirming the significance of the 
territorial jurisdictions where these are developed and applied. This is also so in relation to 
the geographical location of CAS. The complex and contested allocation mechanisms that 
define the exact location of CAS across municipalities underscore the significance of national 
as much as regional, provincial and municipal administrative jurisdictions. Mapping the 
spatiality of EU borders requires an awareness both to processes that externalise borders and 
render them mobile, and to processes that reinforce territorially-inscribed jurisdictions 
(Novak, 2017). 
Such conceptualisation of the spatialities of EU borders, finally, sheds light on the forces able 
to flexibly articulate themselves across both mobile and territorial dimensions (Novak, 2011), 
and all three sections have been concerned with understanding the character of the 
transformations engendered by the crisis. While it could be possible to interpret the evolution 
of the reception system described above as a frantic response to the urgent need to adapt and 
transform the existing framework to the crisis, it appears from the above discussion that these 
transformations are geared towards the structural reconfiguration of governance mechanisms, 
a reconfiguration that is neoliberal in its character. This is so in terms of the government- 
orchestrated and yet decentralised privatisation of the management of CAS (see Darling, 
2016); of the increased frequency with which laws and normative documents that weaken the 
critical scrutiny of democratically-elected officials are enacted in the name of the “crisis” (see 
Bruf, 2017); of the increased reach of the EU border regime across administrative 
jurisdictions, reaching as far as “peripheral” municipalities (see Allen and Cochrane, 2010). 
Indeed, if on one side, as correctly pointed out by de Genova (2017) and others, the 
externalisation and virtualisation of EU borders need to be understood as part of the ongoing 
reconfiguration of a planetary regime dedicated to the neoliberal government of human 
mobility, on the other side, the force of neoliberalism is not exhausted by this imperative. 
Much like in relation to the imposition of Structural Adjustment Programmes in developing 
countries (Johnston and Saad-Filho, 2005) or indeed Europe (Bruf, 2017), EU border 
management is an engine of state transformation. It shifts the relative significance of 
ministries and power centres within the state apparatus and across administrative levels, 
notably, in this case, in favour of the Ministry of Interior. It streamlines and de-centres 
governance mechanisms favouring the rule of the executive over that of elected 
parliamentarians and local administrators and fosters such mode of governance through legal 
and administrative changes. It privatises decision-making processes, transferring public 
authority to private organisations. In sum, it weakens processes of democratic accountability. 
Neoliberalism is an all-pervasive force able to operate across both mobile and territorially- 
inscribed spatialities. 
Clearly, this is not a smooth process, and peripheral locations such as the Macerata province 
are excellent sites to capture the contested geographies associated to these transformations 
(Painter et al., 2017). Whether the latter will lead to the realisation of an EU superstate (ibid) 
or to forms of authoritarian neoliberalism (Bruf, 2017) that reassert national sovereignty as 
the locus of territorial governance and control, remains to be seen. For sure, what can be 
learned about the European migration crisis by studying it at its margins is that these 
transformations do not exclusively invest migrants. The efficiency-driven governance 
models, the weakening of democratic accountability, and the privatisation of public functions 
that these transformations foster, necessarily invest migrants and non-migrants alike. 
This recognition is important in the current political debate about the crisis, on two counts. 
First, because foregrounding the all-pervasive force of neoliberalism may well foster the 
identification of terrains of struggle that, much like neoliberalism itself, cut across 
“dangerous divides” (Anderson, 2013) between migrants, whether excluded or subordinately 
included by borders, and non-migrants. Second, because these terrains are likely to be 
different in different contexts, considering the variegated configurations of neoliberalism 
across scales (Peck and Tickell, 2002). As the previous section suggests, the crevices used by 
EU border management to resolve its latent tensions are situated and fluid, and so must be 
our responses. 
 
1 As of 15th September 2017. Data collected during field research, see later in the text for timeframe of data 
collection and updates. 
2 The number refers to non-EU28 asylum seekers who have lodged an asylum application in a EU28 country for 
the first time. I am using the EUROSTAT dataset, available at 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do I am taking the year 2011 as a referent, as 
this coincides with the s.c. Arab spring and the beginnings of turmoils in the Middle East that have engendered 
large number of asylum application in Europe. In the case of arrivals to Italy, the referent of this article, 2011 
 
also marks with the year in which asylum applications more than doubled compared to previous years, and in 
which institutional responses by the Italian government began a rapid transformation, as detailed later in the 
text. 
3 Press release by ISMU available at http://www.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Comunicato-Ismu- 
richiedenti-asilo_febbraio-2017_.pdf, see also note 6 below. 
4 See Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011, available at 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32011L0095 (accessed 6 July 2018). 
5 These time limits are confirmed by art. 27 comma 2 of the D.Lgs 25/2008. See Nascimbene, 2003 for a 
discussion on the ambiguities concerning time limits. 
6 Data are extremely difficult to obtain, as I realised during field research, when access to it was constantly 
hampered by competent authorities. Here, I am using data from Papavero, 2015, from a factsheet contained in a 
press release by ISMU available at http://www.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Comunicato-Ismu- 
richiedenti-asilo_febbraio-2017_.pdf and from the statistical fact sheet of the Ministero Interno available online 
online at http://www.libertaciviliimmigrazione.dlci.interno.gov.it/it/documentazione/statistica/i-numeri-dellasilo 
(accessed 16 November 2017). The first shows a graph from 1997 to 2014, but without a table indicating precise 
number of arrivals by year. The second one displays the number of arrivals and number of asylum requests by 
year, and thus their gap. The third, in its 1990-2016 “statistical summary”, only displays the number of formal 
asylum requests. As an indicator of the significance of the gap between arrivals and asylum requests, the ISMU 
factsheet records the number of arrivals in 2011 as 62.692 persons and that of asylum requests as 37.350. 
Newspapers regularly report arrival numbers, and while I have taken them into consideration when providing 
estimates in this paper, I have not used their figures as they often leave their data unreferenced. 
7 See http://www.osservatoriomigranti.org/?accoglienza-normativa-nazionale and www.sprar.it/wp- 
content/uploads/2016/06/Documenti/.../Raccolta-normativa.pdf for an excursus (accessed 16 November 2017) 
8 See http://old.asgi.it/home_asgi.php%3Fn=1550&l=it.html for relevant documents. (accessed 16 November 
2017) 
9  See Lunaria, 2013, p.92, note 74. 
10 See for example http://www.interno.gov.it/it/temi/immigrazione-e-asilo/politiche-migratorie. Most of the 
Decrees and Law cited in this section cover both aspects. 
11  The number of CAS in Macerata is as of September 2017. 
12 See documents related to the Commissione Parlamentare on asylum and reception issues at 
http://www.camera.it/leg17/1281?shadow_organo_parlamentare=2649&shadow_organo=102&natura=M 
13 See http://www.camera.it/_dati/leg17/lavori/documentiparlamentari/IndiceETesti/022bis/006/INTERO.pdf 
pages 65-66. 
14 The s.c. Delrio law of 2014 emptied many of the competences of Provinces, redistributing them to 
municipalities and newly constituted Metropolitan cities. Provinces are enshrined as an administrative level of 
the Italian state in the constitution. Their abolishment was proposed as part of a constitutional reform aimed at 
transforming the Italian parliament in a 2016 referendum, which was rejected by the electorate. 
15 The tender documents are available at http://www.prefettura.it/macerata/news/Bandi_di_gara_e_concorsi- 
47328.htm (accessed 28 November 2017) 
16 Data as of 29 August 2017, from Prefettura Macerata 
17 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics- 
explained/index.php/Asylum_quarterly_report#Main_trends_in_the_numbers_of_asylum_applicants 
18              http://www.interno.gov.it/it/sala-stampa/dati-e-statistiche/sbarchi-e-accoglienza-dei-migranti-tutti-i-dati 
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